Can Private School Subsidies Increase Enrollment for the Poor? The Quetta Urban Fellowship Program by Kim, Jooseop et al.
Economics Publications Economics
1999
Can Private School Subsidies Increase Enrollment
for the Poor? The Quetta Urban Fellowship
Program
Jooseop Kim
Korea Institute for Vocational Education and Training
Harold Alderman
World Bank
Peter F. Orazem
Iowa State University, pfo@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs
Part of the Education Economics Commons, Family, Life Course, and Society Commons, and
the Urban Education Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
econ_las_pubs/338. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economics Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Working Paper Series on
Impact Evaluation of Education Reforms
Paper No. 11
Can Private Schools Subsidies Increase Schooling for the
Poor?: The Quetta Urban Fellowship Program
Jooseop Kima
Harold Aldermanb
Peter Orazema
May 1998
Development Research Group
The World Bank
aIowa State University
bWorld Bank
This paper is a product of the research project “Impact Evaluation of Education Projects Involving
Decentralization and Privatization” which has been financially supported by the Development Research
Group and the Research Support Budget (RPO No. 679-18) of the World Bank.  The findings,
interpretations, and conclusions are the authors’ own and should not be attributed to the World Bank,
its Board of Directors, or any of its member countries.  Comments are welcome and should be sent
directly to the author(s).
For copies, please send a request to Patricia Sader at psader@worldbank.org
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Poor?: the Quetta Urban Fellowship Program
Abstract
Private schooling - often postulated to improve school quality - may also prove to be a means to
leverage public funds in order to provide access to schooling at rates faster than possible with
public funds alone.  This study measures the success of such an effort to stimulate girls' schooling
through the creation of private girls’ schools in poor urban neighborhoods of Quetta, Pakistan.  The
impact evaluation, which employs on an experimental design, indicates that the program increased
girls’ enrollments by an average of 33 percentage points.  At the same time, boys' enrollments rose
an average of 27.5 percentage points, partly because boys were also allowed to attend the new
schools, and partly because parents would not send their girls to school and not also educate their
boys.  While the success of the program varied from one neighborhood to another, success was not
clearly related to the relative wealth of a neighborhood or to parents' education levels.  Thus, the
program offers tremendous promise for increasing enrollment rates in other poor urban areas.
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1Introduction
Primary school enrollment rates in Pakistan are lower than in other countries at the
same level of economic development. The proportion of children in school is about half
that in India and three quarters that in Bangladesh and Nepal. Nationally, the gross
enrollment rate is 58 percent, 69 percent for boys but only 42 percent for girls. The
enrollment gender gap is even wider in the province of Balochistan with 62 percent of
boys but only 29 percent of girls enrolled.1  The government of Pakistan has established a
goal of universal primary enrollment by the year 2006. This would require more than
doubling girls' enrollment nationally and more than tripling girls' enrollment in
Balochistan. However, in Pakistan, as in many other countries, increasing government
school capacity is constrained by inadequate public budgets.
Expansion of school capacity has the potential to target poor households on the
basis of residency since the children least served by existing public schools reside in rural
areas or poor neighborhoods of cities.  There is evidence that school enrollment and
achievement in Pakistan are constrained by insufficient school supply in these areas.2
However, in addition to limitations on recurrent budget, the government is limited in that it
generally constructs, rather than rents, school capacity.  This poses a particular problem in
poor urban neighborhoods, since the government requires that the neighborhood provide
land for a new government school.  Many neighborhoods have developed as squatters’
communities where the necessary defined property rights are lacking.
Cultural prohibitions against exposing girls to the public have meant that the
absence of girls’ school in many communities has meant a lack of educational opportunities
2for girls.  If universal primary enrollment is to be achieved for girls, more segregated girls’
schools or coeducational schools with female teachers will need to be established.  Given
the limitations on increased government provision, one strategy is to try to increase the
availability of private girls’ schools in poor neighborhoods.
This study measures the success of such an effort to induce the creation of new
private girls' schools in Quetta, the capital city of Balochistan. This study is one of the few
attempts to use experimental design methods to evaluate an educational policy innovation.
By randomizing the implementation of the pilot program, we are able to generate robust
estimates of the impact of the program on enrollments. Random assignment avoids the bias
in impact assessments inherent when the program is applied to individuals or groups
believed to benefit atypically from the program.
This study shows that regardless of how the impact is measured, the program
increased girls’ enrollments by an average of 33 percentage points.  At the same time, boy
enrollments rose an average of 27.5 percentage points, partly because boys were also
allowed to attend the new schools, and partly because parents would not send their girls to
school and not also educate their boys. While neighborhoods differed in the success of the
program, success was not clearly related to the relative wealth of a neighborhood or the
education levels of the parents. Thus, the program offers tremendous promise for
increasing enrollment rates in other poor urban areas.
I.  The Urban Girls' Fellowship Program
In February 1995, the Balochistan Education Foundation launched the Urban Girls'
Fellowship (UGF) Program in Quetta, the capital and largest city of Balochistan. The
3purpose of this pilot project was to determine whether establishing private schools in poor
neighborhoods was a possible and cost effective means of expanding the delivery of
primary educational services to girls in lower income neighborhoods of Quetta. Recent
evidence from the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey suggests that about 77 percent of
girls who start school finish the primary cycle. It was thought that if these poor girls started
school, it was probable that many would persist in school long enough to attain literacy.
School establishment was encouraged through subsidies paid directly to schools.
Schools were assured support from the government for a period of three years.  The initial
subsidy was Rs.100 (about $3) per month per girl enrolled up to an upper scholarship limit
of 10,000 (100 girls x Rs.100 per girl) per month.  This subsidy was sufficient to cover
typical tuition at the lowest priced private schools.  In addition to the 100 Rs. per month,
each school received 200 Rs. per girl to defray start up costs.  The subsidy was reduced in
the second year, and cut again in the third year.  By the fourth  year, schools were expected
to be largely self sufficient through fees and private support, although schools would still
be eligible to apply to the Balochistan Education Foundation for additional grants.
Fellowship schools were allowed to admit boys provided that boys made up less
than half of the total enrollment.  Boys had to pay tuition at least equal to, and often greater
than, girls. The grant calculation depended only on enrolled girls so that the school
received no additional subsidy for enrolling boys.  Schools were required to keep class
sizes to no more than a total of 50 boys and girls per classroom and that there must be one
teacher for classroom.
4To implement the program, a non-governmental organization (NGO) was contracted
to conduct an initial census of each site to insure that there was a sufficient number of girls
in the target age range (4-8) and to inform parents of the program.3 The emphasis was to
create a partnership between parents in a neighborhood and the school operator. This was
to be accomplished by first conducting a meeting of parents in a neighborhood to see if they
were interested in attracting a private school to their area. The parents were asked to form
a committee, which would represent the neighborhood in negotiations with potential school
operators. With the assistance of the NGO, the parents' committee developed a proposal
regarding the neighborhood's requirements for a school, resources the neighborhood was
willing to provide the school (i.e. land, buildings, equipment) and any other requirements
an operator was expected to satisfy. Experienced school operators were provided these
specifications and were allowed to make proposals in response. Each parent committee
was allowed to select their neighborhood school operator from among the proposals or to
choose to operate the school themselves.
II. Survey Design and Data Strategies
Because government resources are in limited supply and the need to expand
enrollment is so great, the government of Balochistan needed an accurate measure of the
program's success and its prognosis for expansion. It was decided to use randomized
assignment into treatment and control groups to accomplish this task. However, there were
several factors that constrained the experimental design.4 The government only allocated
resources sufficient for 10 pilot schools.  With only ten possible sites, the government
5opted to place one neighborhood school in each of ten urban slum areas of Quetta. This
was considered politically expedient because it assured that all major ethnic groups would
get at least one school. Ethnic groups tended to segregate into one or two of these slum
areas, so the government could not be accused of favoritism. The only restrictions site on
choice were that it had to be composed of poor households and that there be no existing
government girls' school in the neighborhood.
A second problem was that there was no recent census of the population from
which one could define treatment and control populations. The most recent census was
fourteen years old, and the population of Quetta was estimated to have grown at about
seven percent per year since then. Consequently, an area frame sampling strategy was
chosen to define the treatment and control neighborhoods.
The area frame was designed as follows. A map of Quetta was produced with each
of the ten slum areas outlined. In each area, three sites, literally points on a map, were
selected. One of these areas was chosen randomly to be the treatment neighborhood for the
creation of a private school.5 The other neighborhoods were reserved to be controls. The
only criterion for the treatment neighborhood was that it could not already have a
government girls' school. While it was possible that the control sites would contain a
government girls' school, it turned out that none of the control sites had girls' schools
either.
By randomizing site selection, it was hoped that there would be no systematic
differences in characteristics and behavioral patterns between the control and the treatment
neighborhoods. However, the lack of information on population characteristics and the
6small number of pilot sites led to the possibility that the two groups would differ in
important ways. Therefore, it was necessary to collect information on population attributes
in all sites to enable us to test for statistically important differences in treatment and
control populations that might also affect differences in enrollment outcomes between the
two groups. We also have an interest in determining if relative success of a school depends
upon observable neighborhood characteristics.
The baseline data collected in the treatment and control sites included information
on socioeconomic characteristics of the households, parents' education, and educational
attainment and current enrollment status of all children in the household. All households in
the treatment neighborhoods were surveyed at the time of the promotion of the scholarship
program in the summer of 1994 before any fellowship schools were opened. The baseline
survey of households in the control group neighborhoods was conducted in July 1995.
Because most of the data on socioeconomic status of the household does not change over
time, the difference in the timing of the surveys should not be problematic. Information on
the enrollment status of control neighborhood children was obtained for the current year
(1995) and retrospectively for the previous year.6  Subsequently, enrollment data was
collected in 1996 in both treatment and control neighborhoods. All data collection and
training of surveyors was supervised by the Balochistan Education Management
Information System (BEMIS) to insure data comparability.
III. Theory of Enrollment Response to the Girls' Fellowship Program
7Before conducting the statistical comparison of the treatment and control
neighborhoods, it is important to identify the possible endogenous responses to the
program. It is also important to identify the exogenous variables that might condition the
magnitude of those responses. Households are assumed to have parents, a daughter and a
son. Parents are assumed to derive utility from their own consumption of goods (Zh) and
from the human capital of their daughter (Hf) and their son (Hm). The utility function has the
form U=U(Zh, Hf, Hm, T), where T is a vector of taste indicators that are not subject to
choice. Parents maximize utility subject to a budget constraint. Sending their daughters to
school requires that the household sacrifice current consumption and human capital
investment for their sons.
Let Y be household income, Pz be the price of consumption goods, and Pf  and Pm
are the prices of schooling for their daughter and son, respectively. The schooling price
includes school fees, the costs of transportation and materials, and the opportunity cost of
child time. The income constraint on parental utility maximization is Pz Zh+ Pf Hf + PmHm =
Y.
For cultural reasons, parents may face some disutility from sending their daughters
to school. Social prohibitions against exposing their daughters to the outside world will
cause them to discount the utility they get from their daughter's education by some factor
df<1. Then the parents utility will have the form U(Zh, dfHf, Hm, T), with UHf = dfUH(Zh,  Hf,
Hm,T) and UHm = UH(Zh, Hf, Hm, T).
The first order conditions yield the following relation:
(2)
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8where UHf and UHm represent the marginal utility of girls schooling and boys schooling,
respectively. To get parents to equalize schooling for their boys and girls so that Hf =
Hm = H, the cost of girls schooling must be discounted by Pf = dfPm < Pm. Alternatively, if
the pecuniary costs of schooling are the same for boys and girls so that Pf = Pm, then the
right-hand-side of (2) will equal one. Then, dfUH(Hf) = UH(Hm), which implies that UH(Hf)
> UH(Hm). Diminishing marginal utility would then imply that Hm > Hf at the optimum.
Reduced form equations for boy's and girl's schooling have the following functional
forms:
(3)  H H P P Y P T)f f f m f z= ( , , , , ,d
(4)  H H P P Y P T)m m m f f z= ( , , , , ,d
The reduced form equations suggest that enrollment will depend on school fees, the
rate at which parents discount girls' education relative to boys, income, the price level, and
tastes. Numerous studies suggest that education is a normal good so that ¶Hm/¶Y > 0 and
¶Hf/¶Y > 0.  Those conditions are sufficient to insure that ¶Hm/¶Pm< 0 and ¶Hf/¶Pf <0. The
discount factor df acts as an additional price on girls' schooling, so ¶Hf/¶df < 0.
The girls' fellowship program will lower Pf, so girls' schooling will increase. The
impact of the fellowship program on boys' enrollment is ambiguous. However, there are
two reasons to believe that the girls' fellowship program will have a positive impact on
boys' schooling. First, the program creates a new low-priced private school that can accept
boys, lowering Pm, although it lowers Pf even more. Second, boys' education may increase
as their sisters go to school for a very practical reason - parents may want their boys to
escort their sisters to and from school. This implies that boys' education and girls'
9education may be complementary goods so that ¶Hm/¶Pf < 0. In any event, it will be
important to monitor both boys' and girls' enrollments in response to the program.7
Equations 3) and 4) suggest that income, the cost of schooling, and the disamenity
of sending girls to school may condition the enrollment response to the fellowship
program.  Schooling costs are measured by fees charged in existing neighborhood schools,
average distance to schools (a proxy for transport costs) and the opportunity cost of child
time (a function of the child's age and its square). The parents' disamenity for sending girls
to school is assumed to be inversely related to fathers' and mothers' education. Parents'
taste for education are also assumed to depend on the child's birth order (there may be a
preference for educating the eldest child, particularly the eldest boy) and on citizenship
(refugees may value education less or may feel the return from education is less). These
variables comprise the vector of exogenous variables we will use in the analysis below.
IV. Differences and Similarities Between Treatment and Control Neighborhoods
Statistical properties of the baseline data are described in Table 1 for both
treatment and control neighborhoods. Sample statistics are reported separately for boys
and girls. The treatment sample included 1,310 children, 781 girls and 529 boys. The
control sample included 1,358 children, 697 girls and 661 boys. Enrollment rates for boys
and girls in the treatment group were higher than those in the control group: 6.6 percent
higher for girls and 8.8 percent higher for boys. The other variables in Table 1 represent
the exogenous variables believed to affect parental enrollment choices for their children.
Most of the variables come directly from the questionnaire. However, distance to school
10
and annual fees were measured by neighborhood averages of the children in school.
Household income was estimated using information on the number of adults in the
household with various educational attainments and various household assets. Details on
the estimated measure of household income are contained in Appendix 2.
The purpose of the control group is to get information on the counterfactual state.8 A
reasonable approximation of the change in outcome due to the program intervention is to
measure the difference in outcomes between the treatment and control groups before and
after the intervention. However, it is important to check whether there are important
differences between the treatment and the control groups which might also result in
different outcomes.9
Tests for statistical significance of the differences between the treatment and the
control groups were performed in two ways. First, in order to check if the randomization
yielded observationally equivalent treatment and control populations, we conducted tests
of the equality of means of the endogenous and exogenous variables. A second analysis
was based on estimated enrollment equations in the baseline data. These tested the null
hypothesis of the equality of behavioral coefficients in the enrollment choice models for the
treatment and control neighborhoods.
A. Tests of Equality of Means in the Baseline Data Sets
The third and sixth columns of Table 1 report tests of the hypotheses that the means
of variables are equal across the treatment and control groups. Standard errors are
corrected for the effects of cluster sampling using Huber's method. Baseline enrollment
rates for both sexes were significantly higher in the treatment group.10  In addition, there
11
were significant differences in average mother's education and birth order between the
treatment and control girls, although the differences were small numerically. For boys,
father's highest grade and citizenship were significantly higher in the treatment group. Once
again, the differences in means were small numerically. The joint test that the means were
equal across all variables was easily rejected. Based upon the results, we can reach a
statistical conclusion that the treatment and control samples are not identical, a problem
which will be addressed in the analysis below.
B. Tests of Equality Coefficients in the Baseline Enrollment Model
A second way that the treatment and control neighborhoods may differ is in the
decision-making process of parents. To check this, we estimated the following binary
model of  parental decision regarding their children's schooling:
(5) R X Uit t it it
* '= +b
where R if Rit it= >1 0
*
R if Rit it= £0 0
*
In equation (5), an unobserved variable R it
*  depends on the index function, b t itX
' ,
where Xit is the vector of characteristics in equations (3) and (4) which affect parental
choices regarding their children's enrollment. When R it
*  is positive, we observe the child
in school and Rit=1. Otherwise, the child will not enroll.
Table 2A presents the baseline probit estimates of enrollment choice for boys and
girls. Separate estimates are presented for the treatment and control neighborhoods. The
estimated parameters exhibit the same sign patterns in the treatment and control groups and
are qualitatively similar to results obtained in other studies of enrollment. The coefficient
12
on household income is positive in both samples. Parental education positively influences
their children's enrollment, and mother's education is a more important factor influencing
girl's education than father's education. Enrollment increases with age, but at a diminishing
rate. First-born children have a higher probability of enrollment than their younger siblings,
but the coefficient is not significant. Native Pakistanis have a higher probability of
enrollment. After pooling the treatment and the control data, we can also estimate the
effects of neighborhood average distance to school and average annual fees. They have
negative coefficients except for a positive but insignificant effect of annual fees on boy's
schooling.
Table 2B shows the result of the tests of equality of coefficients between the
treatment and the control groups. The coefficients for the two groups are not statistically
different, except for father's educational level in the girls' enrollment equation. This result
suggests that parental decision making on education is similar in the treatment and control
neighborhoods. Despite significant differences in characteristics as reported in table 1, we
can still measure the change in enrollment due to the program by measuring the difference
between treatment and control group enrollment rates, holding constant the differences in
the exogenous variables.
V. Evaluation Strategies and Results
The evaluation problem is essentially a missing data problem. A child i cannot be
simultaneously in both the treatment state (RTit) and the control state (RNit). Letting di = 1 if
child i is in a treatment neighborhood, and di = 0 otherwise, the observed outcome(Rit) can
13
be expressed as Rit = di RTit + (1-di)RNit. Given the impossibility of observing the true
impact of the fellowship program (at = RTit - RNit), the goal is to get an unbiased estimator
of at.
One way to get an unbiased estimator of at is to use a control group to derive
estimates of the counterfactual state. The initial group of estimators assume that the control
state does not vary across individuals.  Then, the difference in outcomes between the
treatment and control groups is used as an estimate of at. These estimators depend only on
comparisons of endogenous outcomes without controlling for the exogenous variables.
Mathematically, these are defined as
(6) Reflexive:
E d E R E R dR it i Tt i i( | ) ( ) ( | )a = = - =1 10
(7)  Difference in Differences:
E d E R E R E R d E R dD it i Tt Nt i i i i( | ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ( | ) ( | )]a = = - - = - =1 1 00 0
(8) Mean-Difference:
E d E R E RM it i Tt Nt( | ) [ ( ) ( )]a = = -1
where subscripts T and N represent treatment neighborhoods and control neighborhoods,
respectively. The reflexive estimator (6), measures the expected program effect as the gap
between the expected enrollment rate after the program, E(RTt), and the expected
enrollment rate before the program was implemented, E(Ri0|di=1). The underlying
assumption of this method is that the period t outcome in the treatment neighborhood
without the program would have been identical to the observed pre-program outcome.
14
The difference in differences estimator (7), measures the expected program effect
by the gap between the post-program outcome in the treatment group, E(RTt), and that in the
control group, E(RNt), adjusted by the pre-program difference between the two groups.  In
this method, it is assumed that the difference in outcomes between the two groups before
the program intervention would be constant over time if it were not for the program, so the
difference in outcome between the two groups after the program intervention reflects the
difference due to the program as well as to the initial difference. Differencing the
differences yields an estimate of the program effect.
The mean-difference estimator (8), measures the expected program effect by the
post-program observed gap in outcomes between the treatment group and the control group.
This method assumes that the control group mimics perfectly the treatment group.
The methodological differences follow from different assumptions about the
unobserved counterfactual state.  The methods based on equations (6) through (8) assume
that the counterfactual state is non-stochastic. If we relax that assumption so that the
counterfactual state, RNit, follows a stochastic process, it is possible to set up the following
model:
(9) R X UNit it it it= +b
In equation (9), Xit is the vector of observed characteristics as in equations (3) and (4),  Uit
is an error term, and bt is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Modifying equation (9)
using the definition of the program effect, ait, and assuming that the program effect
conditional on Xit is invariant across individuals but not time so that ait=at, we have
(10) Covariate post-test:
15
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In equation (10), Rit is the observed enrollment rate, and di is a dummy variable indicating
residence in a fellowship school neighborhood. Assuming Xit is independent of the
unobserved variables Uit, so that E(Uit|Xit)=0 for all i,t, we can estimate equation (10) using
a cross-sectional data set.
If the data set includes repeated observations of individuals, an alternative way to
estimate the program effect using econometric analysis is to use a first-difference model. If
the effect of Xit varies over time, we can modify equation (10) to be
(11)     First difference with time-varying covariate effects:
R R X X d U Uit i it t i i t it- = - + + -0 0 0 0b b a .
A further assumption that bt is also time invariant simplifies equation (9) to
(12)     First difference with time invariant covariate effects:
( )R R X X d U Uit i it i i t it- = - + + -0 0 0 0b a . 11
There are two ways of measuring the effect of the program on enrollments. One is
to measure the change in enrollment for children in the target age of 5 to 8. The other is to
measure enrollment rates longitudinally for children aged 5 to 8 in the initial year of the
fellowship program.  The first of these will tell us if the initial impact on school
enrollments carry over to children initially too young to enroll.  The second will tell us if
children who enroll as a result of the program are also more likely to stay in school than
enrolled children in the control group.
A. Results of Age-specific Analysis
16
The first four columns of table 3 report age-specific enrollment rates for boys and
girls before and after the program intervention. The enrollment rate for boys decreased 7.6
percent and that for girls rose 1.3 percent in the control neighborhoods. At the same time,
enrollment in the fellowship school neighborhoods rose 19.8 percent for boys and 26.0
percent for girls. From this information, we can apply the three different methods based on
equations (6) through (8). The results are similar across all three methods. All imply that
the fellowship program had a positive effect on girls in the target age group, and that
parents sent their boys to school in increasing numbers as well. Applying the same methods
to two years of data yield even larger estimates of the enrollment effects of the fellowship
schools.
An alternative method based on equation (10) can also be applied to the same
sample.12 The first two and the last two columns of table 4 report the results of the
covariate post-test probit analysis of the probability of enrollment using cross-sectional
data. The enrollment rate in fellowship neighborhoods rose 33.4 percent for girls, and 22.4
percent for boys in the first year of the fellowship program. After two years, enrollment in
the fellowship neighborhoods had risen  42.7 percent for girls and 38.4 percent for boys.
These results are consistent with the results in table 3. First, this result shows that parents
made responses very quickly to the fellowship program. Considering the fellowship
schools were established in February in 1995, and that survey data were collected in July
of that year, the response of the parents in the target area was nearly instantaneous. This
supports the view that there was excess demand for primary education in these poor areas.
Second, the result suggests that the fellowship program was continuously successful year
17
by year. For girls, the estimated program effect increased by almost 10 percent in 1996
over the estimated program effect in 1995.  Boys' enrollment rates grew 16 percent in the
year after implementation.
B. Results of Cohort-specific Analysis
The cohort-specific analysis follows the enrollments of a fixed group of children
over time. This sample has two distinct advantages over the age-specific analysis. First, it
allows us to see if initial gains in enrollment persist over time. Because it is assumed that
five years of schooling are needed to attain permanent literacy, this program will be truly
successful only if children remain in school for several years. The other advantage of  the
cohort-specific analysis is that we can control for individual specific unobservable effects
which might also be correlated with program outcomes.
The last four columns of table 3 report the enrollment rates before and after the
program intervention for fixed cohorts of boys and girls in the treatment and the control
groups. We begin with the cohort aged 4-7 in 1994 to capture the children aged five to
eight in 1995.13 Because enrollments increase with age at least initially, some of the
enrollment growth in the cohort-specific analysis will reflect a maturity effect.
Nevertheless, the comparison between the fellowship and control neighborhoods should
difference away this maturity effect, leaving an unbiased estimate of the program effect.
Estimates of the fellowship effect for the cohort-specific sample are summarized in
the last three rows in table 3. The reflexive method will yield upward biased estimates
because of the maturity effect, as evidenced by the 46.8 percent increase in boys'
18
enrollment, and 44.3 percent increase in girls' enrollment. These estimated effects are much
bigger than the reflexive estimates in the age-specific analysis.
The estimates from the difference in differences and mean-difference methods
remove the maturity effect under the assumption of common maturity effects across
neighborhoods. Consequently, the measured program effects using difference in differences
and mean-difference methods are smaller than the reflexive estimate, and are more
comparable to the estimates using the age-specific sample. All the results show large gains
in both boy and girl enrollments following the opening of the fellowship schools. Most
estimates show slightly higher enrollment gains for girls than for boys. Looking across the
age-specific and cohort-specific estimates, we can conclude that girl enrollments rose by
25-35 percent as a result of the program, and that boy enrollments rose by a few percentage
points less.
The first four columns of table 4 report the cohort-specific post-test probit analysis
of the probability of enrollment. The inclusion of quadratic terms in age control for
maturation, so the coefficients on the treatment dummy can be interpreted as an estimate of
the program effect controlling for the maturity effect. The program effects for the children
aged five to eight in 1995 were measured as 33.4 percent and 22.4 percent increase in
enrollment for girls and boys, respectively. One year later, the measured effects grew an
additional 6.5 percent for girls, and 4.4 percent for boys. Rising effects over time indicate
that the large initial enrollment gains persisted over time. The persistence of the effect is a
promising sign for the continued survival of these schools, particularly since fees rose in
the second year in many schools.
19
C. Results of First-Difference Analysis
Another possible source of bias in the estimate of the program effect is unobserved
heterogeneity in children that is correlated with the program effect. If cross-sectional
differences in individual fixed effects are responsible for measured program effects, then
we can remove the fixed effect by differencing the dependent variable.
Table 5 presents the results of the first difference analysis under the maintained
assumption that the coefficients of the regressors are time invariant as in equation (12). The
dependent variable is the change in enrollment status from before to after the
implementation of the program. The coefficient on the treatment dummy measures the effect
of the program on enrollment choice. The last two specifications of the first difference
analysis allow the coefficients on the individual and neighborhood effects to vary over
time as in equation (11). The results corroborate results presented above in the sense that
the coefficient representing the treatment effect, is significantly positive, and the program
effect was larger for girls' enrollment than boys' enrollment. However, now the estimated
program effect is larger after one year than after two years, in contrast to the cross-
sectional results. The cause of the discrepancy is unclear, but must be related to the control
for fixed effects. Note that the enrollment rates were initially higher in the fellowship
neighborhoods, and children in school before the fellowship schools opened will not
contribute to the measured fellowship school effect in the first difference analysis. Note
also that it is possible that the opening of the fellowship schools encouraged parents to
send their children to school at younger ages, and the smaller effect over time reflects the
first-time enrollment of older children in the control neighborhoods. In fact, some of the
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later enrollment growth in control neighborhoods may be related to the fellowship program
if the promotion of children's education in fellowship neighborhoods spilled over to the
control neighborhoods. Nevertheless, the estimated two years enrollment growth effects
are still large. Controlling for fixed effects lowers the estimated effect by 12 to 30 percent,
leaving the estimated enrollment impact of the fellowship school to be 24.2 percent for
boys and 28.1 percent for girls.
D. Results of Neighborhood-Specific Analysis
Given the strong average estimated enrollment growth due to the creation of the
fellowship schools, an important issue is whether there is any significant variation in
program effects across the neighborhoods. If so, are there any identifiable neighborhood
attributes which increase the likelihood of program success? This analysis is necessarily
speculative since there are only 10 neighborhoods and therefore 10 degrees of freedom.
Neighborhoods were divided into two groups, neighborhoods with over 30 percent
increase in girls' enrollment, and those below 30 percent.
Table 6 reports the summary statistics for these more and less successful
neighborhoods. Eight neighborhoods out of ten neighborhoods fell into the more successful
group, so the less successful neighborhoods were the clear exception. Several important
findings are apparent. For most variables, the sample means are similar in the two groups.
One apparent difference is in household income. However, the higher average income is in
the less successful neighborhoods. Clearly if the concern was that poor neighborhoods
could not benefit from a subsidized private school, that fear was exaggerated.
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A higher average of parental education in neighborhoods is also not a prerequisite
for success. Differences in parental education were insignificant. Taking the averages at
face value, the program was more successful in the neighborhoods with more educated
mothers but less educated fathers.
The variables which differed significantly between the more and less successful
neighborhoods were citizenship and distance, although the numerical differences were not
great. Citizenship was positively related to enrollment of both boys and girls in the
baseline estimates. It is reasonable to assume that the greater success in neighborhoods
with higher proportions of citizens reflects a stronger taste for schooling or higher expected
return to education among Pakistanis relative to Afghan refugees who make up the majority
of non-citizens in the city.14
Shorter distance to school reflects higher density of schools in a neighborhood. It is
not clear why fellowship schools in neighborhoods with more competing schools should
do better. On the other hand, the difference in commuting time between more and less
successful neighborhoods was only two minutes, so the difference is probably unrelated
school success.
An intriguing result was that boys' enrollments rose in neighborhoods with more
success raising girls' enrollments, but that boys' enrollments fell in the neighborhoods that
were relatively less successful. Why this happened is unclear. However, the result is
consistent with a presumption that boys' enrollment and girls' enrollment are
complementary so that successfully increasing enrollment of one gender will also increase
enrollments overall.
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VI. Comparison with Alternative Policy Options
Given the apparent success of the fellowship program, is it cost effective when
compared to alternative policy options? Table 7 reports the estimated changes in
alternative policies needed to match enrollment increase that resulted from the fellowship
program. Two policy options were considered: income transfers to poor households and
construction of new schools. Our estimates are based on estimated enrollment choice
elasticities with respect to income and distance.
Income has only a moderate impact on participation in the program. Consequently,
the benefits of the project are not strongly skewed to upper income households. The
moderate income response also implies that it would take a fair amount of income transfer
to achieve the same impact on enrollments as the project encouraged. In particular, the
income response in our estimates imply that 3471 Rs. of direct subsidy to a household
would be needed to raise the probability of girls' enrollment by 25 percent. This is well
above the initial subsidy - including start up cost - 1400 Rs. per year per girl in the
fellowship program. As boys’ enrollment is less income sensitive, a similar increase in
boys' enrollment probability would require an income transfer of 15030 Rs. Therefore, the
fellowship option would be less expensive than income subsidies.
The result for Quetta is rather similar to results for both sexes in low income
neighborhoods of Lahore, where 10 percent increase of household income causes a 1.2
percent increase in the enrollment rate in private schools (Alderman, Orazem, and Paterno
1996).  Thus, in Lahore, a city where overall primary school enrollment rates are over 90
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percent an income transfer of 14808 Rs would be required to raise enrollment 25 percent
for both sexes.
The overall impact of the fellowship program might also be due to the fact that it
decreased the distance to schools. Unfortunately, there was insufficient variance in the
distance to schools in this sample to accurately estimate the distance response directly.
Using the 1996 coefficient of distance for girls from table 4 of -0.03 in our study, we
estimate that the distance to private schools would have to be cut in half to increase
enrollment by the same amount as the project achieved. Halving distance to schools in a
three dimensional environment implies a four-fold increase in the number of schools.
VII. Conclusions and Extensions
A summary of all measured program effects is contained in table 8. All of the
results show that the fellowship program has positively affected enrollment for both boys
and girls. Most show that the effect was larger for girls' enrollment. One can conclude that
the estimated program effects are robust to differences in assumptions about possible
biases due to measured and unmeasured differences between treatment and control
neighborhoods. Before the project was implemented, it was not clear whether low girls'
enrollment was due to cultural barriers which cause parents to withhold their daughters
from school or to inadequate supply of girls' schools. The results of the urban fellowship
experiment provide strong evidence that subsidizing the establishment of girls' primary
schools can lead to sharp increases of girls' enrollment. In addition, even though the
fellowship was given only to girls, boys' enrollment in those neighborhoods also sharply
increased. This suggests that there also may have been excess demand for boys' primary
24
education in these poor areas. The measured change over two years yielded mixed
evidence on whether the enrollment growth advantage in fellowship neighborhoods over
control neighborhoods continued to grow over time. However, even if the initial
enrollment gain decreased in subsequent years, the enrollment gains after two years are
around 25 percentage points. This is a substantial improvement over the baseline
enrollment rate of 45 percent for 5-8 year-old girls.  School success appears not to depend
on neighborhood income or other observable socioeconomic variables, suggesting that
expansion of the program to other poor neighborhoods is also likely to be successful.
Future work will be required to assess the long term effects of the fellowship
program. In particular, the future sustainability of the schools and the enrollment effects
after the subsidies expire will need to be assessed. The short term success of the
fellowship program does not guarantee long term success when the financial burden of
supporting the schools are fully borne by the neighborhoods. School outcomes will also
need to be assessed. The ultimate success of the fellowship program depends on whether
children attain literacy.
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics of Baseline Datasets and Tests of the Equality of Means Between the
Treatment and Control Groups1, 2
Girls Boys
Variable Treatment Control t-value3 Treatment Control t-value3
Enrollment rate 0.366 0.300 2.67 0.486 0.398 3.03
(0.482) (0.459) [1,468] (0.500) (0.490) [1180]
Household income 7,108 6,808 1.03 7,005 6,592 1.41
(7,157) (3,011) [1,476] (6,815) (2,847) [1188]
Age 6.026 6.001 0.19 6.040 6.003 0.44
(1.403) (1.429) [1,476] (1.426) (1.444) [1188]
Mother’s highest grade 0.619 0.395 2.08 0.623 0.414 1.74
(2.243) (1.844) [1,466] (2.208) (1.918) [1183]
Father’s highest grade 3.405 3.079 1.27 3.635 2.723 3.38
(4.745) (4.882) [1,417] (4.579) (4.548) [1162]
Birth order 2.832 3.004 2.21 3.074 2.965 1.27
(1.474) (1.510) [1,476] (1.447) (1.482) [1188]
Citizenship 0.868 0.835 1.79 0.877 0.814 2.98
(0.339) (0.371) [1,476] (0.329) (0.389) [1188]
Distance to school 17.77 17.81 0.05 16.93 16.42 0.62
(9.443) (9.991) [491] (9.338) (9.394) [515]
Annual fees 244.3 187.0 1.19 531.3 391.7 1.73
(536.0) (502.5) [480] (1036.8) (765.1) [505]
Joint test4 121.61 82.20
Number of observations 781 697 529  661
1Age 4 to 8 for both groups.  The baseline data was collected in 1994 for the treatment group, and
collected in 1995 for the control group.
2The numbers shown in parentheses are the standard deviations and those in the square brackets are
the degrees of freedom.  The degrees of freedom differ due to missing information in the surveys.
3The null hypothesis is that the mean of the variable in the treatment group is equal to that in the
control group.  If the t-value is smaller than 1.96, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 0.05
significance level.
4Reported numbers are F statistics with degrees of freedom (9,1478) for girls and (9,1190) for boys.
The null hypothesis was that the means of the variables between the treatment group and the control group
are equal for all variables.
Table 2A.  Baseline Probit Analysis of the Probability of Enrollment
Girls and Boys Girls
Variable Treatments Controls Pooled Treatments Controls Pooled Treatments
Household
income/10,000
0.138 0.422 0.143 0.171 0.572 0.196 0.037
(2.362) (2.879) (2.710) (2.377) (2.870) (2.921) (0.346)
Age 1.820 2.235 2.060 1.611 2.623 2.045 2.176
(5.226) (6.323) (8.396) (3.612) (4.864) (6.048) (3.674)
Age square -0.101 -0.140 -0.124 -0.089 -0.174 -0.127 -0.119
(3.621) (5.014) (6.347) (2.508) (4.127) (4.745) (2.513)
Mother’s highest grade 0.051 0.094 0.065 0.067 0.118 0.082 0.007
(2.443) (3.422) (4.091) (2.500) (2.649) (3.739) (0.197)
Father’s highest grade 0.023 0.065 0.049 0.027 0.084 0.057 0.025
(2.369) (6.634) (7.337) (2.271) (5.997) (6.570) (1.498)
Birth order -0.029 -0.036 -0.030 -0.017 -0.020 -0.021 -0.036
(0.918) (1.214) (1.407) (0.416) (0.461) (0.732) (0.717)
Citizenship 0.693 0.335 0.569 0.628 0.214 0.482 0.762
(5.207) (2.556) (6.375) (3.590) (1.079) (3.839) (3.545)
Girl -0.419 -0.541 -0.474
(4.878) (5.340) (7.106)
Distance to school -0.001
(0.036)
Annual fees/1,000 -0.380
(1.185)
Number of observations 1,231 1,324 2,555 725 677 1,402 506
Pseudo R2 0.277 0.295 0.273 0.230 0.331 0.254 0.358
Table 2B.  Chi-square Statistics of the Hypothesis of Equal Coefficients in the Treatment and Control
Groups
Variable Girls and Boys Girls Boys
Income 2.03 2.58 0.25
Age 0.09 0.02 0.14
Age square 0.89 0.47 0.99
Mother’s highest grade 1.50 0.73 1.95
Father’s highest grade 7.68* 6.88* 1.09
Birth order 0.07 0.00 0.04
Citizenship 1.20 1.36 0.00
Girl 0.05
Joint Test 29.90* 23.33* 13.68*
*Null hypothesis of equality rejected at the .05 significance level.
Table 3.  Enrollment Rate Before and After Program Intervention
Age-specific Cohort-specific
Treatment Control Treatment Control
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
Enrollment Rate Before Program
E0)
56.33 45.29 51.06 34.86 38.75 34.06 36.55 29.03
Enrollment Rate in 1995 (E95) 64.29 63.93 49.68 38.37 64.29 63.93 49.68 38.37
Enrollment Rate in 1996 (E96) 76.15 71.30 43.50 36.20 85.50 78.36 59.87 45.97
E95 - E0 7.96 18.64 -1.38 3.51 25.54 29.87 13.13 9.34
E96 - E0 19.82 26.01 -7.56 1.34 46.75 44.30 23.32 16.94
Age-specific Cohort-
specific
Measure of Effect Boys Girls Boys Girls
Reflexive, 1994-1995 8.0 18.6 25.5 29.9
Reflexive, 1994-1996 19.8 26.0 46.8 44.3
Difference in Differences, 1994-1995 9.3 15.1 12.4 20.5
Difference in Differences, 1994-1996 27.4 24.8 23.4 27.4
Mean-Difference, 1994-1995 14.6 25.6 14.6 25.6
Mean-Difference, 1994-1996 32.7 35.1 25.6 32.4
Note:  Since 1994 baseline data for the control group was not available, they were estimated from
the 1995 baseline data in the way that children who enrolled in advanced grades in 1995 and enrolled in
recall data were considered in enrolled in 1994.
Table 4.  Post-test Probit Analysis of Probability of Enrollment Using Cross-sectional Data1
19952 1996, Cohort-specific3 1996, Age-specific4
Variable Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys`
Treatment dummy 0.034 0.224 0.399 0.268 0.427 0.384
(10.148) (5.143) (9.679) (5.511) (8.488) (5.495)
Household income/10,000 -0.001 -0.003 0.012 0.072 0.034 0.128
(0.022) (0.080) (0.333) (1.513) (0.724) (1.872)
Age 0.141 0.276 0.229 0.936 0.615 1.330
(0.652) (1.197) (0.797) (3.416) (1.970) (3.925)
Age square -0.008 -0.016 -0.011 -0.057 -0.036 -0.083
(0.496) (0.890) (0.570) (3.113) (1.546) (3.268)
Mother’s highest grade 0.016 0.030 0.029 0.011 0.027 0.018
(0.040) (2.330) (1.505) (0.867) (1.822) (1.231)
Father’s highest grade 0.013 0.003 0.030 0.011 0.035 0.020
(3.383) (0.707) (6.293) (2.433) (6.656) (3.523)
Birth order -0.008 -0.026 -0.016 -0.020 -0.0002 -0.031
(0.720) (2.042) (1.214) (1.516) (0.016) (1.904)
Citizenship 0.152 0.225 0.143 0.201 0.187 0.173
(3.040) (4.362) (2.374) (3.501) (2.783) (2.465)
Distance to school -0.008 0.003 -0.029 -0.027 -0.035 -0.036
(1.074) (0.358) (3.190) (2.347) (3.361) (2.511)
Annual fees/1,000 -0.443 -0.030 -0.170 -0.362 -0.316 -0.618
(3.640) (0.241) (1.088) (2.535) (1.719) (2.723)
Number of observations 1.031 830 845 700 764 650
Pseudo R2 0.141 0.100 0.312 0.215 0.350 0.380
1The coefficients reported her are dF/dX, where F is dependent variable and X is independent
variable, not actual coefficients.  Since the dependent variable is a discrete variable, dF/dX is not identical
to actual coefficients.  The numbers shown in the parentheses are z-values corrected for cluster effect.
Dummy variables for each neighborhood included.
2Children in this data are aged 5 to 8 in 1995.  Dependent variable is enrollment status in 1995.
3Children in this data are aged 5 to 8 in 1995.  Dependent variable is enrollment status in 1996.
4Children in this data are aged 5 to 8 in 1996.  Dependent variable is enrollment status in 1996.
Table 5.  First Difference Analysis for Change of Enrollment Decision1
1994-1995 1994-1996 1994-1995 1994-1996
Variable Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys
Treatment dummy 0.367 0.292 0.264 0.088 0.469 0.428 0.281 0.242
(5.518) (3.591) (3.165) (0.909) (5.833) (3.755) (2.931) (1.723)
D Age square -0.077 -0.082 -0.047 -0.046 -0.071 0.032 0.079 0.073
(4.785) (4.447) (5.006) (4.502) (0.343) (0.137) (0.641) (1.323)
Age 94 square -0.001 -0.022 -0.047 -0.080
(0.040) (0.525) (1.055) (1.686)
Income/10,000 -0.151 -0.009 -0.009 -0.005
(2.680) (0.122) (1.309) (0.588)
Mother’s highest grade -0.007 0.016 -0.009 -0.030
(0.374) (0.652) (0.380) (1.020)
Father’s highest grade 0.004 -0.028 0.043 0.014
(0.458) (2.751) (4.561) (1.226)
Birth order -0.029 -0.050 -0.008 -0.021
(1.152) (1.667) (0.250) (0.616)
Citizenship 0.006 0.093 0.243 0.212
(0.047) (0.717) (1.515) (1.318)
Distance to school -0.001 0.027 -0.054 0.029
(0.051) (1.407) (1.936) (1.272)
Annual fees/1,000 -0.755 -0.103 -0.588 0.765
(2.424) (0.299) (1.623) (1.813)
Number of observations 1,055 861 863 725
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.05
1The coefficients reported here are dF/dX, not actual coefficients.  Children in the sample are aged
4 to 7 in 1994.
Table 6.  Statistical Summary of Successful and Unsuccessful Neighborhoods
Girls
Variable More successful Less successful t-value
Income 6,819 8.060 2.05
(6690) (8468)
Mother’s highest grade 0.68 0.42 1.37
(2.36) (1.81)
Father’s highest grade 3.28 3.82 1.34
(4.76) (4.70)
Citizenship 0.90 0.76 4.94
(0.30) (0.43)
Distance to school 17.44 19.06 9.55
(2.05) (1.84)
Annual fees 247.0 251.6 0.42
(128.1) (134.9)
Number of observations 599 182
Girls’ enrollment
change
41.5% 8.5%
Boys’ enrollment
change
36.8% -1.8%
Table 7.  Estimated Needs to Meet Target Effect
Elasticities Change required to meet target effect (25%)
Alternatives Girls Boys Girls Boys
Direct subsidy to
household
0.503 0.115 3471 Rs./household 15030Rs./household
(50%) (150%)
Decrease distance to
school
0.320 0.732 13.48 min. 5.71 min.
(78%) (34%)
Note:  Children in the sample were aged 4 to 7.  Numbers in parentheses reports the amount as
percentage needed to meet target effect.  For example, direct subsidy to household which leads 50%
increase in household income may increase 25% increase in girls’ enrollment rate.
Table 8.  Comparison of the Effect of the Fellowship Program
Age-specific Cohort-specific
Methods Mathematical Expression Boys Girls Boys Girls
Measure of effect using means
Reflexive (1994-1995) ER(ait|di=1)=E(RTt)-E(Ri0|di=1) 8.0 18.6 25.5 29.9
(0.42) (0.44) (0.43) (0.44)
Reflexive (1994-1996) ER(ait|di=1)=E(RTt)-E(Ri0|di=1) 19.8 26.0 46.8 44.3
(0.51) (0.53) (0.52) (0.54)
Difference in Differences (1994-1995) ED(ait|di=1)=[E(RTt)-E(RNt)]-[E(Ri0 |di=1)-
E(Ri0|di=0)]
9.3 15.1 12.4 20.5
(0.53) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54)
Difference in Differences (1994-1996) ED(ait|di=1)=[E(RTt)-E(RNt)]-[E(Ri0 |di=1)-
E(Ri0|di=0)]
27.4 24.8 23.4 27.4
(0.73) (0.70) (0.74) (0.71)
Mean-Difference (1994-1995) EM(ait|di=1)=E(RTt)-E(RNt) 14.6 25.6 14.6 25.6
(0.65) (0.67) (0.65) (0.67)
Mean-Difference (1994-1996) EM(ait|di=1)=E(RTt)-E(RNt) 32.7 35.1 25.6 32.4
(0.59) (0.65) (0.60) (0.66)
Measure of effect using regression
Covariate post-test (1995 cross-sectional) Rit=Xit bt + diat + Uit 22.4 33.4 22.4 33.4
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Covariate post-test (1996 cross-sectional) Rjt=Xjt bt + djat + Ujt 38.4 42.7 26.8 39.9
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
First-difference, time-invariant b (1994-1995) Rit-Ri0=diat+Uit-Ui0 29.2 36.7
(0.08) (0.07)
First-difference, time-invariant b (1994-1996) Rit-Ri0=diat+Uit-Ui0 8.8 26.4
(0.10) (0.08)
First-difference, time-varying b (1994-1995) Rit-Ri0=XI(bt-bt-1)+diat+Uit-Ui0 42.8 46.9
(0.11) (0.08)
First-difference, time-varying b (1994-1996) Rit-Ri0=Xi(bt-bt-2)+diat+Uit-Ui0 24.2 28.1
(0.14) (0.10)
Note:  Numbers in parentheses report standard errors.
Appendix 1
It is difficult to derive income estimates for households in Pakistan. The relative
importance of production for home consumption, informal labor market arrangements,
barter trade and other economic activity occurring outside formal markets complicate
income measurement. The budget for this project did not include resources sufficient to
conduct a careful analysis of income for each household. However, the Pakistan Integrated
Household Survey (PIHS) had conducted such a detailed survey of household incomes and
socioeconomic attributes in 1991. The PIHS allows us to predict household income based
on a regression of income on easily observed household attributes. The current study
collected information on these household attributes and then used the PIHS estimates to
generate predicted incomes based on these attributes.
The PIHS income equation is reported in Table A1. The specification follows that
used by Alderman and Garcia (1996). That study estimated income and expenditure
equations for 217 households in a single district in Balochistan. The Alderman-Garcia
estimates can serve as independent validation of the income estimates we derive from the
PIHS data. The Alderman-Garcia estimates are less useful for our purpose than is the PIHS
because their data include only rural households and the data are from 1986. The PIHS has
sufficient urban observations to estimate an income equation for urban households, and it is
closer to our 1994 base period. The variables in the income equation include the number of
adult males and females, the number of males and females with primary, secondary and
tertiary level schooling, and the value of household assets. Alderman and Garcia found that
this income specification generated predicted values that performed well in explaining
household savings, loans, and nutrition status.
In general, the PIHS income estimates are sensible. Households with more capital
assets, more human capital and more adult males have higher incomes. The results
corresponded reasonably well in sign with those in Alderman and Garcia. More
importantly, the two estimates generate equivalent estimates of relative household income.
The correlation in predicted income based on the PIHS versus the Alderman-Garcia
estimates is 0.82.  It should also be noted that the higher variance in income in the treatment
neighborhoods is a result of three wealthy households residing in those neighborhoods.
When those households were removed, the treatment and control neighborhoods had
similar means and variances in estimated incomes.
Appendix Table A1:  Income Equations
Variable Alderman and Garcia PIHS
Intercept 5,999 3,303
(2.61) (4.64)
Number of males aged 16 or more 938 1,219
(0.92) (3.73)
Number of males aged 6-16 1,691 a
(2.09)
Number of females aged 16 or more -709 -188
(-0.54) (-0.57)
Number of females aged 6-16 1,009 a
(0.64)
Number of children 5 or below 2,820 a
(2.99)
Number of males with primary schooling 6,140 -1,171
(2.95) (-2.55)
Number of males with secondary schooling 2,279 -364
(1.69) (-0.92)
Number of males with more than secondary schooling 6,435 147
(1.41) (0.96)
Number of females with primary schooling 6,707 -406
(1.85) (-0.69)
Number of females with middle schooling or more 7,758 889
(1.35) (3.68)
Rainfed land 110 b
(2.34)
Irrigated land 665 b
(4.93)
Acres of orchards 4,065 b
(2.57)
Value of livestock 0.335 b
(1.05)
Value of vehicles 0.171 0.012
(8.55) (2.48)
Value of machinery and tools 0.125 0.007
(1.27) (1.88)
R2 0.747 0.03
N 217 2,112
aNot available in the PIHS.
bNot relevant for urban areas.
Appendix 2
It is possible that the imposition of the fellowship program coincided with other
changes in the structure of parental decisions regarding their children's schooling.  If so,
then we would need to control for changes in the behavioral coefficients over time as well
as measuring the program effect itself.  To investigate this possibility, we tested the null
hypothesis of constant behavioral coefficients against the alternative of time varying
behavioral coefficients.  The results of the stability tests of coefficients in the enrollment
probability equation are reported in Table A2. The results are mixed.  We fail to reject any
individual hypothesis of equality of coefficients for any regressor.  However, the joint
hypothesis of no structural change in all parameters was rejected in both samples of girls
and of boys.  We therefore report the results using both methods.  As shown in the body of
the paper, the results are similar whether or not structural change is assumed.
Appendix Table A2:  t-statistics of Tests of the Hypothesis of Equal Coefficients in the 1994 and 1995
Enrollment Probability Equations
Variable Boys Girls
Income 0.821 0.165
Age 1.907 1.305
Age square 2.213 1.911
Mother’s highest grade 0.287 0.714
Father’s highest grade 0.776 0.507
Birth order 0.345 0.158
Citizenship 0.209 0.507
Joint Test 12.73* 11.67*
*Null hypothesis of equality rejected at the .05 significance level.
Appendix 3
The impact of the fellowship program may be unrelated to neighborhood or
individual characteristics, or it may interact with these characteristics.  In the text, we
show that the effect of the fellowship program did not appear to be related to any
neighborhood attributes.  However, the power of the test is low because of relatively few
degrees of freedom.  We can also investigate this issue at the household level.  Table A3
reports the results of ordered probit first-difference equations in which the treatment
dummy is interacted with all individual attributes.  The coefficients of the interacted
variables are interpretable as the impact of the fellowship program on behavioral
coefficients.
The first two columns of the Table A3 show that there was no structural change in
parental behavior regarding their children's enrollment choice when we allow one year
time lag.   In addition, none of the individual coefficients changed with the imposition of
the school.  The implication is that the new schools had similar effects on girls' and boys'
enrollments regardless of child or household attributes.  This is consistent with our earlier
finding that effects were similar across all types of neighborhoods.
Some weak evidence of asymmetric effects of the program can be found after two
years after the fellowship schools were opened, although the joint test still fails to reject
the hypothesis of neutrality.  The last two columns of the Table A3 shows that younger
children had larger enrollment increases from the program than did older children.  This is
sensible in that children who were older when the school opened were closer to ages
where the parents would remove them from school.  The larger effect on girls is consistent
with the cultural prohibitions on exposing girls to the public once they reach ten years of
age.  In addition,  older children would have higher opportunity costs.   Holding age fixed,
first-born girls had a higher probability of enrollment gains than did later-born siblings.
This may reflect parental preference for  investing in their first-born children's schooling.
Appendix Table A3.  First Difference Analysis With Interactions
1994-1995 1994-1996
Variable Girls Boys Girls Boys
Treatment dummy 1.069 0.497 1.814 2.671
(1.41) (0.59) (2.79) (3.54)
Income/10,000 0.162 0.091 -0.375 -0.003
(0.66) (0.03) (1.91) (0.11)
Age -0.019 0.546 -0.475 1.143
(0.03) (0.78) (0.85) (1.91)
Age square 0.002 -0.054 0.029 -0.100
(0.04) (1.00) (0.70) (2.19)
Mother’s education 0.032 0.002 0.018 -0.006
(0.94) (0.05) (0.63) (0.20)
Father’s education 0.007 0.007 0.024 -0.009
(0.44) (0.43) (1.90) (0.75)
Citizenship 0.156 0.128 0.226 0.469
(0.78) (0.68) (1.43) (3.22)
Birth order 0.074 -0.031 0.069 0.009
(1.88) (0.84) (2.15) (0.32)
Treatment*Income/10,000 -0.103 0.034 0.336 0.124
(0.40) (0.10) (1.61) (0.46)
Treatment*Age -0.016 0.037 -0.198 -0.026
(0.17) (0.36) (2.43) (2.91)
Treatment*Mother’s education -0.032 0.081 0.007 0.054
(0.64) (1.44) (0.17) (1.04)
Treatment*Father’s education 0.002 -0.016 -0.011 -0.012
(0.07) (0.65) (0.60) (0.54)
Treatment*Citizenship 0.178 0.042 0.307 -0.256
(0.58) (0.12) (1.19) (0.84)
Treatment*Birth Order -0.094 -0.034 -0.104 -0.044
(1.56) (0.48) (1.95) (0.70)
Number of observations 890 740 890 740
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09
Joint test 3.39 2.71 11.25 9.99
Note:  The critical value for the joint test is 12.59 at 0.05 significance level.
Endnotes
1 Statistics based on 1996 data provided by the Pakistan Education Management
Information System.
2 Alderman, Behrman, Ross and Sabot (1996) found that differences in school availability
accounted for 30-40 percent of the gap in cognitive skills between boys and girls in rural
Pakistan.
3 The NGO, the Society for Community Support of Primary Education in Balochistan
(SCSPEB), had several years of experience in implementing primary schooling projects,
primarily school promotion efforts in rural communities.
4 The areas selected were primarily areas where squatters had established residence on
government land that was not served by the Quetta municipal sewer system.
5 As all neighborhoods selected to participate accepted the invitation, the issue of self
selection is moot.
6 This does raise the possibility of recall bias, although parents should be able to remember
whether their children were in school a year earlier. To provide some verification of this,
the analysis that follows uses multiple methods to evaluate the change in enrollment in the
treatment neighborhoods and finds that the conclusions are not sensitive to differences in
evaluation method.
7 Interhousehold allocation of schooling is discussed in Parish and Willis (1993), Butcher
and Case (1994), and Kaestner (1996).
8 Grossman (1994) classifies a randomly assigned counterfactual group as a "control
group", and a nonrandomly assigned counterfactual group as a "comparison group".
9 Newman, Rawlings, and Gertler (1994) pointed out that tests are rarely done for
statistical significance of the differences, so that probabilities of receiving the program
may not be equal for individuals or communities in many of the evaluation studies in
developing countries.
10 The reason girls’ enrollment rates were six percentage points higher in the treatment
neighborhoods is unclear, although we do not believe there was a strategic selection of the
ten fellowship school sites.  Of those girls in school, 39 percent were in private school,
and 61 percent were in government boys’ schools.  The large proportion in private school
is not unusual.  Alderman, Orazem and Paterno (1996) also found extensive use of private
schools by even the poorest households in Lahore, another city in Pakistan.
11 Note that the estimated program effect on first difference analysis is sensitive to the
stability of the coefficient over time and the length of the time lag. To validate (12), it was
                                                                                                                                                                                    
necessary to perform a statistical test of stability of the coefficients over time. The results
of the stability tests do not reject the hypothesis of time-invariant individual coefficients,
but the joint test rejects stability.  Therefore, there is some statistical support for both
specifications (11) and (12).  Details are are attached in Appendix 2.
12 Note that we cannot use methods based on (11) and (12) for the age-specific analysis
because enrollment decisions for younger cohorts can only be observed after the
fellowship schools are in existence.
13 The cohort-specific enrollment rates in 1994 are lower than the 1994 average for the
age-specific analysis. The reason is that the age-specific groups average one year older in
1994. By 1996, the enrollment rates were higher than in the age-specific analysis because
by then, the cohort was one year older on average than the age-specific sample.
14 Lower average citizenship may also signal a neighborhood with greater ethnic diversity.
Because the success of the school depended on an agreement among parents to form a
committee, divisions among ethnic lines may have hindered the success of the school.
